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ANTITRUST REGULATION AND PROBLEMS OF
OLIGOPOLY STRUCTURE: HELIX MILLING CO. V.
TERMINAL FLOUR MILLS CO., 523 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir.
1975).
Although the objective of the Sherman Act' is to promote eco-
nomic competition, 2 the Act explicitly prohibits only agreements in
restraint of trade,3 and monopolization.4 Thus, the express wording
of the Sherman Act is not always congruent with the policies of dis-
couraging barriers to market entry5 or preventing the destruction of
competition.' For example, market control by a few sellers, oligopoly,
although characterized as "inherently anticompetitive,"' is one type
of economic structure which is legal under the Sherman Act. While
the nature of oligopoly is an important factor in Sherman Act analy-
sis,s it is not a Sherman Act violation in itself. Nevertheless, because
the Act prohibits competitors from determining an industry's com-
petitive structure through collaboration,9 careful examination of oli-
gopolistic markets is necessary to prevent further concentration and
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
2 E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). For general studies
on antitrust regulation and industrial organization, see A. NE , THE ANTITRUST LAWS
OF THE U.S.A. (1970); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1970). See also R. CAVEs, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT AND
PERFORMANCE (1972).
Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). The Supreme Court has noted:
Trade restraints . . ., aimed at the destruction of competition, tend
to block the initiative which brings newcomers into a field of business
and to frustrate the free enterprise system which it was the purpose
of the Sherman Act to protect. [Footnote omitted].
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1945).
Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
A "market" is a specific geographic and product area in which certain competi-
tive circumstances are relevant to defining the areas of competition. "Behavior" or
"conduct" describes a firm's acts within a given market. "Structure" refers to market
character such as the number of competing firms in an industry and the capacity of
other firms to enter the market. Within a given market structure, "[m]arket power
is the capacity to act other than as a perfectly competitive firm would. The existence
of such power may sometimes be inferred from structure or performance or both." P.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 133 (1974).
For example, a monopoly in itself is not illegal. Under the rule of reason, how-
ever, any acts which contribute to unreasonable restriction of competition are illegal.
E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See United States v. United
States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
E.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
E.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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reduction of competition.' 0
Section 1 of the Sherman Act" is violated when an unreasonable
restraint of trade within an oligpoly results from a firm's course of
action which serves to exclude competition from that market. 2
Courts have accentuated the anticompetitive and exclusive nature of
oligopoly by utilizing concepts of "barriers to market entry' 1 3 and
"market entrenchment"" to reveal the dangers posed by oligopolies
to economic competition. These analytical tools aid in recognition
and correction of restraints on competition,' 5 and deter increasing
oligopoly power and concentration. The Ninth Circuit recently em-
ployed these analytical devices in Helix Milling Co. v. Terminal Flour
Mills Co., '1 where the court considered the problem of firms in an
oligopolistic industry selecting their own competition. Helix held that
a valid cause of action was raised under § 1 of the Sherman Act by
plaintiff's claim that it was unlawfully excluded from competition by
defendants' refusal to sell it a production facility. 7
The court in Helix reviewed a summary judgment dismissing a
claim for damages under § 1 of the Sherman Act'8 and § 7 of the
Clayton Act.'9 Plaintiff Helix Milling Company's only flour mill was
destroyed by fire. It sought to reenter the flour and millfeed market
of the Pacific Northwest by negotiating to purchase an available mill
owned by a competitor, defendant General Foods. 0 General Foods,
however, decided to sell its mill to a third competitor, defendant
Terminal Flour Mills Co.2 1 Helix, alleging that purchase of an exist-
ing facility was the only financially feasible method of reentry into
E.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948), for principles relating
to exclusive practices of monopolies.
'3 See note 38 infra and accompanying text.
" See notes 40-49 infra and accompanying text.
11 See Helix Milling Co. v. Terminal Flour Mills Co., 523 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976).
" Id.
'7 Id. at 1322.
" Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
" General Foods wanted to sell its mill because the mill "was not meeting its
profit objectives." 523 F.2d at 1319.
The geographic area in the Pacific Northwest flour market included Oregon,
Washington, Idaho and part of Montana. A geographic market is a territorial area of
effective competition. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321 (1963).
21 Terminal owned or controlled two mills, one located in Portland, Oregon, and
another in Spokane, Washington.
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the market,2 brought suit to enjoin Terminal Flour's purchase and
acquisition of General Foods' mill.? Plaintiff further sued for dam-
ages for violations of § I of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton
Act.24 Helix claimed that the defendants' agreement would result in
Terminal Flour's illegal acquisition of the mill and prevent the plain-
tiff from participating in the Pacific Northwest flour market.2 Ter-
minal Flour, however, moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that the uncompleted acquisition was not a valid basis for a claim
under § 7 of the Clayton Act and that the attempted acquisition did
not violate § 1 of the Sherman Act.
2
1
The Ninth Circuit held that the uncompleted acquisition of Gen-
eral Foods' mill by Terminal Flour was not specifically within the
language of § 7,2 stating that the "language of § 7 speaks in terms of
a completed acquisition rather than an attempted merger." How-
ever, the court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of the
§ 1 claim that the acquisition would constitute an illegal combination
in restraint of trade by blocking Helix' market reentry.
Helix' allegations concerning the competitive structure and mar-
ket shares of the Pacific Northwest market were basic to its Sherman
Act claim that defendants' illegal contract of acquisition excluded it
from competition. The Ninth Circuit found that Helix made signifi-
cant allegations relating to the "necessary market and the substantial
shares of those markets held by General and Terminal. ' 29 Within the
Pacific Northwest flour market, six firms had competed for sales,
" 523 F.2d at 1319.
21 With the commencement of Helix' suit, General Foods revoked its acceptance
of Terminal Flour's offer to buy the mill and Terminal Flour cross-claimed for specific
performance of the contract. Terminal Flour maintained its cross-claim for three years,
after which the court dismissed the cross-claim on Helix' own motion. 523 F.2d at 1319.
21 In addition to its antitrust claims, Helix also sued on grounds of misrepresen-
tation and promissory estoppel by General Foods in failing to consummate the Helix-
General Foods negotiations for sale of the mill. 523 F.2d at 1319.
" Id. at 1319-20.
28 Id. at 1319.
Id. at 1323. Plaintiff had argued that defendants' negotiations, agreement and
contract-enforceable but for the antitrust claim-rendered the acquisition complete
under § 7 of the Clayton Act. Brief for Appellant at 14, Helix Milling Co. v. Terminal
Flour Mills Co., 523 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held
that § 1 was the only proper basis for a cause of action due to the incomplete acquisi-
tion which precluded a § 7 claim.
1 523 F.2d at 1323. The court cited Carlson Companies, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchin-
son Co., 507 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1974), as impliedly supporting this premise. That case
referred to damages resulting upon "completed illegal acquisitions" when the threat
of injury has become a reality. Id. at 962.
523 F.2d at 1321.
1976]
764 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI
including those of plaintiff and defendants. 30 Terminal Flour's ac-
quisition of General Foods' mill would significantly decrease competi-
tion in the relevant market, 31 leaving only four competitors, with the
three largest controlling more than 90% of the market production
capacity. 2 Helix also alleged that Terminal Flour would gain a signif-
icant share of the substantial submarket sales to the Defense Supply
Agency (DSA), in which Helix and Terminal Flour formerly had been
the major suppliers.33 Since § 1 is violated when significant competi-
tion is eliminated between merging competitors, 34 the court indicated
that the distortions in market structure alleged by Helix substanti-
ated its Sherman Act claim.
Based on Helix' allegations, the court held that General Foods'
sale of the mill to Terminal Flour, instead of Helix, could result in
an unreasonable restraint of trade.3 5 Due to the "closed nature of the
market," defendants' course of action could be found necessarily to
exclude Helix from competition. Thus, the closed nature of the mar-
ket as evidenced by virtually insuperable barriers to market entry
was integral to the court's decision.
The significance of the Helix decision rests in large measure on the
court's treatment of the anticompetitive characteristics of oligopolis-
tic markets. In an oligopolistic market a limited number of firms
control the sales of identical or similar products where, commonly,
each seller controls a substantial fraction of the industry's output.
37
3" The largest percentage share available to Helix before its mill was destroyed was
less that 4%, representing the smallest capacity in the Pacific Northwest market.
Plaintiff's Proposed Statement of Agreed Facts, Record at 539.
31 A relevant market includes those suppliers of the same or similar products in
the same geographic area. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962).
32 Based on figures representing each firm's daily production capacity, Terminal
Flour held a 19.6% market share while General Foods held a 10.3% market share. 523
F.2d at 1319.
3 Id. Helix had held a 56% share of the DSA submarket; in Helix' absence from
the market, Terminal Flour held 64% of the submarket sales and General Foods held
8%. Id.
31 Id. at 1321. See United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665
(1964).
3 523 F.2d at 1320-21.
38 Id.
3' In an oligopoly situation such as that in the Pacific Northwest flour market,
each of a few sellers of undifferentiated products have a significant share of the market.
See J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1959).
[One] result of the relative absence of product differentiation, to-
gether with the restricted importance of sales promotion, is that the
OLIGOPOLY STRUCTURE
Individual calculations of price and output distinctly influence simi-
lar determinations of other firms, creating industry interdependence.
In addition, an oligopoly is characterized by limited opportunity for
market entry which serves to preserve the existing structure. Thus,
efforts to regulate oligopolistic markets focus on the degree of concen-
tration, the extent to which entry barriers are controlled or increased
by the participants, and the extent to which mutual interdependence
eliminates opportunities for individual decision making."
The Ninth Circuit's analysis in Helix reflects increasing concern
for the application of antitrust principles to oligopoly structure and
behavior which might tend to encourage concentration and interde-
pendence." The development of law concerning oligopoly has focused
on Supreme Court efforts to limit the growth of oligopoly market
power and structural concentration. 0 In Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States," a Clayton Act § 7 case, the Court recognized and developed
shares of the market secured by the various rival sellers are potentially
quite unstable.
J. BAIN, PRICE THEORY 335 (1952). Nevertheless,
Relatively stable oligopolistic structure seems necessarily to result
from the existence of certain barriers to entry which protect a group
of established firms, permitting them to operate profitably without
inducing many new firms to enter the industry and share the market.
Id. at 272. See generally, F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PEROFRMANCE (1970).
11 See Mueller, The New Antitrust: A "Structural"Approach, 12 VILL. L. REV. 764
(1967).
Entry barriers are an important element of market structure as a major factor for
maintaining or increasing concentration in an oligopoly market. While analysis of
market shares and concentration is significant in determining effects of structural
changes in competition, the threat of potential competition and resulting establish-
ment of entry barriers also has a distinct bearing on competition. Traditional barriers
include economies of scale, absolute cost advantages, and product differentiation. See
J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETrrION 14 (1956). Other types of barriers include
advertising costs, corporate "bigness" and limit pricing. One author has suggested that
analysis of entry barriers should supplement market share analysis. Disner, Barrier
Analysis in Antitrust Law, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 862 (1973).
3, 523 F.2d at 1320. The need to restructure oligopoly markets in order to fulfill
antitrust objectives results from such circumstances as the "absence of vigorous price
competition, wider price-cost margins than would exist under effective competition,
protection of inefficient firms, and a consequent misallocation of economic resources."
Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARv. L.
REV. 1207, 1225-26 (1969).
"* See Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts-From
Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REV. 285, 297 (1966) [hereinafter
BRODLEY].
4 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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basic concepts concerning means of restricting oligopoly power and
increased concentration.4 2 The Court analyzed the scope and charac-
ter of a horizontal merger in terms of the relevant product market,
'
the geographic market,4 and the probable effect of the merger on the
structure of competition within the relevant market. 5 The Court
emphasized the importance of market shares in determining the de-
gree of concentration.46 Moreover, reduction of competition and in-
creased concentration are also functions of high entry barriers.17 In
11 Brown Shoe was the "first to recognize clearly the inherent undesirability of
oligopoly power," BRODLEY, supra note 40, at 299, and reflected the Court's efforts to
promote public policy by stemming the "rising tide of economic concentration." The
Brown Shoe Court examined the legislative history of the 1950 Amendments to § 7,
Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, Act of Dec. 29, 1950, Pub. L. No. 899, 64 Stat. 1125
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970)), and acknowledged the congressional purpose to
stifle economic concentration:
[N]ot only must we consider the probable effects of the merger upon
the economics of the particular markets affected but also we must
consider its probable effects upon the economic way of life sought to
be preserved by Congress. Congress was desirous of preventing the
formation of further oligopolies with their attendant adverse effects
upon control of industry and upon small business.
370 U.S. at 333.
11 The relevant product market is an area of goods or "line of commerce" in which
products subject to restraint compete. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962).
The geographic market is a territorial area of effective competition. Id.
' The Court explained in Brown Shoe, a § 7 Clayton Act case, that the Clayton
Act not only proscribes "acquisitions which might result in a lessening of competition
between the acquiring amd the acquired companies," but also requires a broad exami-
nation of "their effect on competition generally in an economically significant market."
370 U.S. at 335. This examination of all competition which may be affected by horizon-
tal combination utilizes the market share as the most important factor for considera-
tion.
. In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963), the Court
established a presumption of illegality under § 7 of the Clayton Act where a merger
"produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and
results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market." The
Court further explained that relevant rharket share information will reveal whether
there is concentration which is "so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially
that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is
not likely to have such anticompetitive effects." Id. The Court also noted that "if
concentration is already great, the importance of preventing even slight increases in
concentration and so preserving the possibility of eventual deconcentration is corre-
spondingly great." Id. at 365 n.42. The presumption that anything which alters or
creates an oligopoly market is illegal is the primary means by which the antitrust
statutes are adapted to promote public policy to encourage competition and control
oligopoly market structure. See BRODLEY, supra note 40, at 339-40.
1 See note 38 supra. The presumption presented in Philadelphia Bank may be
OLIGOPOLY STRUCTURE
Helix, the Ninth Circuit considered market shares48 and entry bar-
riers in determining the validity of Helix' claim under § 1 of the
Sherman Act.
The Helix court emphasized that, absent a valid business pur7
pose, an agreement or collaborative action which prevents market
entry of competitors and effectively allows existing competitors to
misleading by impliedly attaching lesser importance to factors such as entry barriers
which may tend to increase concentration. A commentator has noted in this regard
that "[entry barriers bear an important relationship to the question of whether an
oligopoly market structure will lead to undesirable manifestations of oligopoly power."
BRODLEY, supra note 40, at 348. See J. BAIN, BARRIERS To NEW COMPETITION (1956).
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), has been criticized for
failing to go beyond considerations of relevant market shares to an analysis of other
economic indications which might serve to refute presumptions of unlawful concentra-
tion preventing competition. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An
Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition
Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 308 (1975) (Posner pointed to "the obvious ease and
rapidity of entry into the retail grocery business" as a major factor not considered in
Von's Grocery). In Von's Grocery, the Court analyzed a horizontal merger's effect on
the preservation of competition between small businesses with emphasis on preventing
any movement toward concentration. The Court, however, did not make any "refer-
ence to oligopoly, entry, or other concepts that might be relevant to an appraisal of
the effect of the merger on competition." Id.
Any possible analytical defects in the Von's Grocery decision may have been
overcome by the Court in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486
(1974). In that case, relevant market share figures were de-emphasized in favor of other
economic factors revealing unique market deviations. In sustaining a horizontal ac-
quisition, the Court examined all "pertinent factors affecting the. . . industry" rather
than relying exclusively on market share statistics. Id. at 498.
11 See United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665, 672 (1964).
Lexington Bank was a horizontal merger case under § 1 of.the Sherman Act. In that
case, two major competitive banks, in a service market of commercial banking and a
county-wide geographic market including four other competitors, had combined in
restraint of trade. Since the action was brought under § 1, restraint of trade had to be
proved instead of a probability of competitive injury. The Court made no comprehen-
sive market analysis but rather presented a simple rule prohibiting merger between
major competitors in the relevant market, a concentrated oligopoly. The Court consid-
ered relevant market shares and concluded that "significant competition will be elimi-
nated by the consolidation," constituting an unreasonable restraint of trade. Id. at 669.
The Court reviewed the § 1 railroad cases which
• . . stand for the proposition that where merging companies are
major competitive factors in a relevant market, the elimination of
significant competition between them, by merger or consolidation,
itself constitutes a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
Id. at 671-72. See United States v. Southern Pac. Co. 259 U.S. 214 (1922); United
States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); Northern Securities Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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select their competition will be illegal.49 The court's determination
was based on the notion that the Sherman Act is violated when a
combination, even in the absence of an explicit agreement, is in-
tended to eliminate potential market participants from that market."
Although the sale from General Foods to Terminal Flour did not
technically "exclude" Helix, the court used principles from "refusal
to deal" or "boycott" cases to demonstrate that any collaborative
action for the purpose of preventing competitor entry into a market
is illegal."' Even though Helix was not a competitor or distributor
whose behavior was the object of coercive activities by defendants,
the court analogized General Foods' decision to sell its mill to Ter-
minal Flour to a boycott situation where firms unlawfully influence
the activities of their competitors. Thus, the Helix court indicated
that the defendants' actions could have been intended to assure
Helix' elimination from competition.52 More importantly, however,
the court emphasized the potential consequences of defendants' con-
duct rather than any conspiratorial motive for which those results
were attained."3
11 523 P.2d at 1320. The court stated: "The Sherman Act prohibits competitors
from selecting who or what their competition will be." Id.
1o The Supreme Court noted in United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S.
127, 142-43 (1966), that "it has long been settled that explicit agreement is not a
necessary part of a Sherman Act conspiracy . ..."
In the context of an oligopoly, exclusionary behavior without valid business rea-
sons may be classified as a § 1 restraint of trade. Even beyond this, a violation may
result where "market power may.be an essential ingredient in *determining the pro-
priety of some kinds of conduct which may have a business justification." Turner, The
Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1207,
1229 (1969).
" See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Asso-
ciated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). General Motors dealt with a situation
where extensive collaboration among car dealers, dealer associations and GMC pre-
vented entrance of and cooperation with discount dealers. "Exclusion of traders from
the market by means of combination or conspiracy is ... inconsistent with the free-
market principles embodied in the Sherman Act. .. ." 384 U.S. 127, 146 (1966).
In Associated Press, the Court determined that the Associated Press By-laws
forbidding members to sell news to non-members constituted a concerted refusal to
deal which was intended to inhibit competition. 326 U.S. 1, 13-14. The Court also
found that "[c]ombinations are no less unlawful because they have not as yet resulted
in restraint." Id. at 12. In balancing the industry's advantages in maintaining the
restrictions against possible public injury, the Court found an illegal refusal to deal
which did not fall within the Sherman Act's rule of reason.
52 See 523 F.2d at 1321.
' Not all anticompetitive combinations are unlawful under the rule of reason,
rather only those "contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of competitive
conditions, whether from the nature or character of the contract or act or where the
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The Ninth Circuit recognized that illegal collaboration in refusing
to deal is determined by examining whether a course of conduct will
effectively result in a restraint of trade.54 Under prevailing author-
ity,'- the nature of such action often does not require extended inquiry
into the "reasonableness of the conduct in the circumstances."'" In-
stead, "[i]t is sufficient that a restraint of trade . . .results as the
consequence of a defendant's conduct or business arrangements. ' 57 A
threshhold determination in examining consequences of the defen-
dants' conduct is whether their agreement was a restraint of trade or
an activity primarily designed to further a legitimate business pur-
pose only indirectly or incidently affecting competition." The ulti-
surrounding circumstances were such as to justify the conclusion" of illegality. Stan-
dard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1910)(Justice White's
opinion noted that not every trade restraint violates § 1 of the Sherman Act, only those
which are unreasonable). See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se
Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 781 (1965).
11 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 12 (1945). In Associated
Press, the inability to buy news would have serious effects in destroying competition
and blocking entry into the news industry.
5 See, e.g., Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). The
Court stated in Klor's that the nature of a refusal to deal cannot "be tolerated merely
because the victim is just one merchant whose business is so small that his destruction
makes little difference to the economy." Id. at 213.
"' United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146 (1966). The Court in
General Motors quoted Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,5 (1958):
[Tihere are certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal with-
out elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use.
Examination of economic motivation for conduct is not necessary when concerted
action deprives a firm of access to merchandise for sale. United States v. General
Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146 (1966). See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light
& Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961), where the Court would not allow justification that a
refusal to deal served to keep unsafe gas burners off the market. See Comment, Use of
Economic Sanctions by Private Groups: Illegality Under the Sherman Act, 30 U. CHI.
L. REv. § 171 (1962).
11 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948), quoted in 523 F.2d at 1321.
See 334 U.S. at 106-8, for the analogous proposition that expansion of market power
or position through restraint of trade is in violation of § 2 prohibition of monopoliza-
tion:
And even if we assume that a specific intent to accomplish that result
[expansion of market power] is absent, he is chargeable in legal
contemplation with that purpose since the end result is the necessary
and direct consequence of what he did.
Id. at 108.
523 F.2d at 1320, citing United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v.
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mate objective of parties engaged in restraint of trade is immaterial
if a consequence of the scheme is the prevention of competition. 9 The
presence of either anticompetitive purpose or effect is sufficient to
establish an unreasonable exclusion from a market in restraint of
trade. 0 Regardless of whether the defendants had a specific purpose
to exclude Helix, a restraint of trade could be found since exclusion
necessarily resulted from the conduct of General Foods and Terminal
Flour in negotiating the purchase of the mill." The undesirable result
of plaintiff's exclusion from competition was emphasized by the Pa-
cific Northwest market structure and the market shares held by Gen-
eral Foods and Terminal Flour.2 As claimed by Helix, a completed
acquisition could have eliminated significant competition between
General Foods and Terminal Flour.
6 3
Since the court held that a jury could find that Helix' exclusion
from competition would increase market concentration, eliminate
significant competition, and necessarily restrain trade, Helix was not
Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062
(1970). See Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PENN.
L. REV. 847, 877 (1955).
"' See 523 F.2d at 1320; United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1002
(9th Cir. 1972).
" See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d
71 (9th Cir. 1969). Although the court found that plaintiff in Hawaiian Oke offered no
evidence of an anticompetitive motive for defendant's termination of plaintiff's distrib-
utorship, the court noted that it is possible for a combination to have so adverse an
effect on competition as to restrain trade unlawfully. Id. at 78. The Helix court noted
this with approval and distinguished Hawaiian Oke as a case where the defendant was
not in competition with the plaintiff. 523 F.2d at 1320-21.
"' Helix may show § 1 illegality in a refusal to deal situation either by establishing
anticompetitive intent or by demonstrating adverse effects on market competition as
a result of defendants' course of conduct. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100,
105 (1945); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416
F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969).
In remanding the case for trial, the Helix court noted the possibility that a "jury
could find here such anticompetitive intent from defendants' action in agreeing to a
course of action which would necessarily exclude Helix from the market. . . and whose
successful attainment would result in an acquisition which could be found to involve
a violation of § 1." 523 F.2d at 1321.
6 523 F.2d at 1321.
6' The Helix court cited United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S.
665, 671-72 (1964) for the principle that:
[Wihere merging companies are major competitive factors in a rele-
vant market, the elimination of significant competition between
them, by merger or consolidation, itself constitutes a violation of § 1
of the Sherman Act.
523 F.2d at 1321.
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required to prove actual public injury," but merely that "it would
have purchased the mill but for the contract between Terminal and
General."65 In this regard, plaintiff alleged that it "was ready, willing
and able to purchase the mill,"" and presumably, Helix could prove
its qualifications to enter the market as a competitor.
By permitting the Sherman Act cause of action and calling for
proof of Helix' ability to purchase the mill and compete in the mar-
ket, the court permitted Helix, a company no longer participating in
the oligopoly, to regulate the sale of available assets in the market.
The status of Helix as a former competitor was a strong indication of
its qualifications to compete and position to challenge defendants'
conduct and thus made its case easier. Nevertheless, the court placed
an initial burden on the defendants to show why the mill should not
be sold to Helix as a market entrant regardless of its position as a
former competitor. Moreover, the court's reasoning apparently enti-
tles any potential competitor to claim exclusion from the market
upon denial of a bid to purchase.
"4 523 F.2d at 1322. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke
Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961). See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). The
Associated Press Court noted with respect to problems of public injury that:
Combinations are no less unlawful because they have not yet resulted
in restraint. An agreement or combination to follow a course of con-
duct which will necessarily restrain or monopolize a part of trade or
commerce may violate the Sherman Act, whether it be "wholly nas-
cent or abortive on the one hand, or successful on the other."
Id. at 12, quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225 (1940).
523 F.2d at 1322.
16 Brief for Appellant at 4. Proof of ability to purchase could be shown by demon-
strating, for example, financial capability, affirmative action to make the transaction
such as active negotiations, ability to enter into all necessary contracts, and appropri-
ate background and experience. E.g., Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 991 (1966).
11 The potential problem of allowing virtually any bidder a § 1 cause of action is
somewhat alleviated by standing requirements as well as proof of damages. Ordinarily,
the plaintiff must have suffered direct injury from proscribed conduct, usually evi-
denced by status as a competitor in the market in which the violation restrained trade.
Direct injury must be established by showing more than mere intent to enter a particu-
lar industry; adequate business involvement and injury may be shown, for example,
by demonstrating substantial preparedness to enter, amount of expenditures in seeking
entry, extent of negotiations, and prior experience in the business. See generally, Note,
Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section "4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 570 (1964).
Once standing is established, a plaintiff must prove that the violation was the
actual cause of loss; the defendant then bears the risk of uncertainty in measuring
damages. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562
(1931). Damages may not be speculative, but approximations are sufficient if they are
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Under the rule in Helix, a valid claim could be established by a
potential market entrant upon proof of an attempt to enter a market
with a reasonable chance of business success on the basis of experi-
ence, attempts to participate, financial capability, and availability
of facilities. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit recognized that General
Foods and Terminal Flour were most likely aware of the consequences
of their agreement to the plaintiff, specifically as a former competi-
tor.6" Thus, the court fashioned its requirements of proof with special
regard to the closed nature of the market, the availability of a single
facility, plaintiff's former competitive status as proof of its ability to
compete, the defendants' knowledge of plaintiff's position and bid.
The Helix decision illustrates the Ninth Circuit's concern that the
consequences of any agreement between defendants would reduce
competition and increase concentration in the Pacific Northwest
market. In order to avoid this result, the court permitted the jury to
decide whether Helix' reentry into the market as a qualified competi-
tor was necessary to increase competition within the industry. This
is consistent with judicial recognition of the inherent dangers of oligo-
poly,69 which has facilitated the use of both § 1 of the Sherman Act 0
a "just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant data." Bigelow v.
RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946). Measurement of harm may be
shown indirectly through loss of profits caused only by a violation. Methods of proof
include showing profits before and after a violation, or profits of comparable firms. See
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Richfield Oil Corp. v.
Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960); Note,
Private Treble Damage Antitrust Suits: Measure of Damages for Destruction of All or
Part of a Business, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1566 (1967).
. The Ninth Circuit recognized the implications of defendants' knowledge of
plaintiff's outstanding bid:
In such a factual setting, where entry to the market by the plaintiff
allegedly is prevented by a merger or acquisition which would violate
§ 1 of the Sherman Act and where the defendants were aware of the
bid by the plaintiff, there is a Sherman Act § 1 cause of action
[footnote omitted].
523 F.2d at 1322 (emphasis added). See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Hand, J.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
fg The anticompetitive nature of oligopolistic organization is difficult to define,
particularly in situations of merger and acquisition.
[Regardless of the intentions of the merging parties, it is possible for
the gradual transformation of an industry from one of many compet-
ing firms to one of only a few competitors to increase the incidence of
collusion. This is the fundamental economic rationale of the antimer-
ger law.
R. POSNER, ANTITRUST 398 (1974). See Shepherd, Conglomerate Mergers in Perspective,
2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 15 (1968).
" The structural complexities of oligopoly markets often render it difficult to
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and § 7 of the Clayton Act" in preventing anticompetitive alteration
of existing market structures.
7
1
determine economic values in the context of § 1. The Sherman Act is not ordinarily
used to prevent potential collusion in an economy of oligopolistic interdependence.
Section 1 as judicially interpreted specifically proscribes only unreasonable contracts,
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, some of which may be per se illegal.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, instead, is used prophylactically to prevent emerging
oligopolies and unduly concentrated market power by looking to the long-term conse-
quences of a merger or acquisition. Accordingly, emphasis is placed on efforts to iden-
tify and prevent anticompetitive alteration of market structures. "[T]he primary role
of Section 7 enforcement is to preserve and promote market structures conducive to
competition." Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice § 2, 1 CCH TRADE REG.
REP. 4510 (1975). The purpose of § 7 of the Clayton Act is "to arrest incipient threats
to competition which the Sherman Act did not ordinarily reach." United States v.
Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 171 (1964). The application of this principle to
oligopoly markets rests upon "[t]he core question [which] is whether a merger may
substantially lessen competition, and [which] necessarily requires a prediction of the
merger's impact on competition, present and future." FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,
386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967). See, e.g., United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,
353 U.S. 586 (1957).
"1 The Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice provide instructive criteria
for scrutiny of horizontal mergers and structural alterations challenged under § 7 of
the Clayton Act. Clayton Act purposes include:
(i) preventing elimination as an independent business entity of any
company likely to have been a substantial competitive influence in a
market; (ii) preventing any company or small group of companies
from obtaining a position of dominance in a market; (iii) preventing
significant increases in concentration in a market; and (iv) preserv-
ing significant possibilities for eventual deconcentration in a concen-
trated market.
Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice § 4, 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 4510
(1971). These criteria are not exclusive:
Market shares are the primary indicia of market power but a judg-
ment under § 7 is not to be made by any single qualitative or quantita-
tive test. The merger must be viewed functionally in the context of
the particular market involved, its structure, history and probable
future. . . . Moreover, the competition with which § 7 deals includes
not only existing competition but that which is sufficiently probable
and imminent.
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458 (1964).
72 The consequences of horizontal merger, for example, were noted in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964):
It would seem that the situation in the aluminum industry may be
oligopolistic. As that condition develops, the greater is the likelihood
that parallel policies of mutual advantage, not competition, will
emerge.
Alcoa cited United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), as support-
ing the dual necessities of preventing a market from becoming unduly concentrated
and preventing increased concentration in an already concentrated market. Brown
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The prospect of further concentration in the Pacific Northwest
flour market prompted a careful examination of all allegations to
allow a § 1 claim in order to prevent significant reduction of existing
competition and excessively restrictive barriers, to market entry.73
Such scrutiny required consideration of all economic factors in the
oligopolistic industry, especially definition of existing and potential
competitive market shares. Thus, Helix was given the opportunity to
show that the defendants' agreement might "contribute directly and
materially to the growth or maintenance of concentrated oligopoly
power in a definable market."
The general applicability of the Helix decision in permitting chal-
lenges of oligopoly restructuring should put firms in such an industry
on guard as to any potentially anticompetitive effects of market res-
tructuring. 75 According to Helix, barriers to market entry may not be
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), was also cited in regard to the use of §
7 to prevent probable and substantial lessening of competition.
Various alternatives to restructuring under currently available statutory means
have been suggested by a number of scholars. See, e.g., Turner, The Scope of Antitrust
and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1207 (1969). Such
suggestions have included: (1) possible legislative efforts to restrict "unreasonable
market power" beyond the strictures of § 1 and defined in terms of excessive market
shares, (2) application of § 2 of the Sherman Act to oligopolies in the same manner
used to adjudge illegal monopolies, (3) rigorous application of § 7 of the Clayton Act
to horizontal mergers or acquisitions where their illegality in concentrated markets is
based on strict definitions of relevant product and geographic markets and specific
market share percentages. Other definitive criteria within the third alternative might
include, for example, number of sellers, level of buyer concentration, product homo-
geneity and prior history of collusion. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A
Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1593-1603 (1969)(Posner emphasized be-
havioral correction rather than market restructuring in the context of § 1 remedies to
noncompetitive pricing in oligopoly markets). See also Adams, Market Structure and
Corporate Power: The Horizontal Dominance Hypothesis Reconsidered, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 1276, 1279 (1974).
" Possible, though difficult, defenses to such forced restructuring might include
proof of ease of alternative methods of entry, proof that a valid business dealing
resulted only indirectly in anticompetitive consequences, and proof of a plaintiff's own
inability to purchase or enter the market.
11 BRODLEY, supra note 40, at 315. The Helix court gave weight to the Lexington
Bank rule, supra note 48, that § 1 is violated where significant competition is elimi-
nated between merging competitors holding substantial shares of relevant markets. 523
F.2d at 1321. The defendants' agreement to sell the mill to Terminal might serve to
intensify an already concentrated market which would violate § 1.
'" Courts must consider whether eliminated competition is significant within the
context of total industry competition and what effect such eliminated competition will
have on the structure of a defined relevant market. Justice Frankfurter phrased this
requirement very simply in his concurring opinion in Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 27 (1945): "The decisive question is whether it is an unreasonable
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enhanced or raised by intraindustry competitor selection which effec-
tively excludes entry by qualified potential competitors. This rule
encourages the development of judicial regulation of oligopolies 7 with
the specific goal of inhibiting techniques of competitive exclusion.
Helix implies that a firm must sell its assets to a qualified competitor
not currently within the market. Such a requirement is dictated by
policy against market entrenchment or concentration which renders
consequences of industrial conduct determinative of trade restraints.
PAMELA J. WHITE
restraint. This depends, in essence, on the significance of the restraint in relation to a
particular industry."
76 This is not to imply that any oligopoly market tending toward increased concen-
tration is presumptively evil. "Antitrust law must not attempt to restructure every
market with relatively few sellers, for the effort is always costly and sometimes unnec-
essary or futile." P. AREEDA, ANTrrRusT ANALYsIs 235 (1974). Judicial hesitancy to
restructure oligopolies and reduce economic concentration is often justified by the
presence of such factors as "workable" competition, high level industrial efficiency,
economies of scale, and overall "net economic performance" in terms of consumer
satisfaction and comfort. Id. at 235-36. Rather, courts should be concerned only with
limited industrial restructuring of harmful concentration or "all acquisitions likely to
lessen competition or to lead toward monopoly." Kramer, Economic Concentration
and the Antitrust Laws, 1975 WASH. U. L. Q. 165, 177.
Upon finding antitrust violations, district courts have considerable leeway to cor-
rect those situations giving rise to the violations.
The fashioning of a decree in an antitrust case in such way as to
prevent future violations and eradicate existing evils, is a matter
which rests largely in the discretion of the court.
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 22 (1945), citing United States v. Cres-
cent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944). In Crescent Amusement, the Court ac-
knowledged the need to deter unlawful conduct and encourage growth of competition
by allowing a considerable range of discretion in district courts. Id. at 185-86. Decrees
may include for example orders of dissolution or reorganizational alternatives designed
to eliminate the source or basis of antitrust violation. See e.g., United States v. Ter-
minal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
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